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DEMOCRATIC PARTY V WISCONSIT EX REL. LAFOLLET-FE: MAY
STATES IMPOSE OPEN PRIMARY RESULTS UPON
NATIONAL PARTY CONVENTIONS?
INTRODUCTION
For the Democratic Party, 1980 was not a good year. At the polls,
incumbent President Jimmy Carter lost to Republican Ronald Reagan;
Democrats lost control of the United States Senate for the first time in many
years, and saw their margin of control in the House of Representatives sliced
dramatically. The Democratic Party also suffered a judicial setback when
the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the validity of Wisconsin's open presi-
dential primary statute. This statute directly conflicted with Democratic
National Party (DNP) rules limiting participation in the National Conven-
tion delegate selection process to publicly affiliated Democrats.1
From a judicial perspective, 1981 was decidedly brighter for the Demo-
crats. On February 25, 1981, the United States Supreme Court in Democratic
Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette2 reversed the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision, holding that Wisconsin may not bind the DNP by
the results of an open presidential primary if the open primary violates Party
rules. While this holding represents a major victory for the DNP, its broader
implications are far from obvious.
I. FACTUAL SETTING
Wisconsin adopted its open primary law in 1905, becoming the first
state to require political parties to select their national convention delegates
through a primary. 3 Although the statute has been modified a number of
times since 1905, the primary election has always been "open." Without
declaring party affiliation, a voter receives a ballot for each party participat-
ing in the election, and in the privacy of the voting booth decides which
ballot to mark. It is this private declaration of party affiliation, as opposed
to a publicly recorded declaration, that characterizes the Wisconsin presi-
dential primary as open.4 Under this system, a voter may cast a ballot for
the candidates of one party only. However, it is possible for an individual to
vote in any party's primary regardless of current political affiliation.
Under the Wisconsin statute, voters do not select actual delegates to the
National Convention; rather, they vote for presidential candidates. 5 Dele-
1. State ex rel. LaFollette v. Democratic Party of the United States, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287
N.W.2d 519 (1980), revd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
2. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
3. 1905 Wis. Laws, ch. 369. Part II of the state court opinion contains a history of the
Wisconsin open primary. 93 Wis. 2d at 493, 287 N.W.2d at 526. See CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, NOMINATION AND ELECrION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES 134 (1980).
4. 93 Wis. 2d at 485, 287 N.W.2d at 523. Wisconsin election laws are contained in WIS.
STAT. ANN. §§ 5-12 (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
5. Wis. STAT. ANN, § 5.37 (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
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gates to the Convention are selected in a separate process determined by
state Party rules.6 The Wisconsin Democratic Party permits only publicly
affiliated Democrats to participate in this process. 7 These delegates, how-
ever, are bound to vote at the National Convention in accordance with the
results of the open primary."
In contrast to the relative antiquity of the Wisconsin open primary law,
the DNP rules which led to the present conflict have their genesis in efforts to
reform and strengthen the Party in the wake of the tumultuous 1968 Na-
tional Convention. 9 During the course of the 1970's these efforts moved in
two directions: one, to open the presidential section process to rank and file
members; and two, to restrict participation to Party members only. Rule
2A, as enacted for the 1980 National Convention, required that participa-
tion in the delegate selection process be restricted to Democratic voters who
had publicly declared and recorded their party preference.' 0
In May 1979, the DNP informed the Wisconsin State Democratic Party
that no Wisconsin delegates to the Convention would be seated who were
bound to vote according to results reached in an open primary. The Wis-
consin Attorney General responded by bringing an original action on behalf
of the State in the Wisconsin Supreme Court against both the State and
National Parties. The Attorney General sought a declaration that the Wis-
consin statute was constitutional and that the DNP could not refuse to seat
the Wisconsin delegation.II The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the stat-
ute constitutional and declared that Wisconsin delegates could not be dis-
qualified solely because apportioned by the results of an open primary. 12
The DNP appealed to the United States Supreme Court.1
3
6. WIS. STAr. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (West 1967 & Supp. 1981).
7. 93 Wis. 2d at 485-86, 287 N.W.2d at 524. Wisconsin Democrats select delegates
through a series of caucuses.
8. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b), (c) (West 1967 & Supp. 1980). Each delegate must vote
for the candidate to whom he or she is pledged on the first ballot, and every ballot thereafter
until the candidate releases the delegate or receives less than one-third of the votes authorized to
be cast.
The DNP pointed out that positions on the Platform, Credentials, and Rules Committees
of the Convention are allocated on the basis of preconvention candidate strength. Thus pri-
mary results can affect Party policy beyond simply the presidential nomination itself. Appel-
lant's Reply Brief at 6, 7, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
9. 450 U.S. at 115. Three different commissions studied and reported to the National
Party various avenues of reforming the delegate selection process: COMMISSION ON DELEGATE
SELECTION AND PARTY STRUCTURE, DEMOCRATS ALL (1973) (The Mikulski Commission);
COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, MANDATE FOR REFORM
(1970) (the McGovern/Fraser Commission); COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION AND
PARTY STRUCTURE, OPENNESS, PARTICIPATION AND PARTY BUILDING (1978) (the Winograd
Commission). The Appendix to the National Party's Jurisdictional Statement, 450 U.S. 107
(1981), contains excerpts from OPENNESS, PARTICIPATION AND PARTY BUILDING, and a fuller
history of the Party's reform efforts. See also Adamany, Cross-Ooer Voting and the Democratic Party's
Reform Rules, 70 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 536 (1976); Segal, Delegate Selection Standards:. The Democratic
Party's Expern'er, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1970).
10. 450 U.S. at 109.
11. Id. at 113. The State Party agreed with the state's position and cross-claimed against
the National Party, seeking an order compelling the National Party to recognize the Wisconsin
delegates selected according to Wisconsin law. Id.
12. 93 Wis. 2d at 525-26, 287 N.W.2d at 543.
13. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction on July 2, 1980. 448 U.S. 909 (1980).
On the same day, the Court stayed the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The Wis-
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Government establishment and regulation of the electoral process are
necessary if the results are to be legitimate expressions of the will of the citi-
zenry. Yet there is an innate tension created by state regulation of elections.
In an open, democratic society elections are mechanisms designed to transfer
power. Despite the necessity of governmental regulation, the state must not
unduly restrict opportunities for those out of power to coalesce, form new
majorities, and "throw the rascals out." Legitimate interests of the state in
bringing order to the electoral process have been recognized, but this power
must be exercised within constitutional limits. 1 4 The difficult questions are
which regulations "pass constitutional muster."
'1 5
In the early part of our nation's history there were no primary elections;
Political parties selected candidates for the general elections through
caucuses or conventions.1 6 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries, states began to require that major political parties select their candi-
dates through state-run primaries. The primary, which takes the place of
party-run selection methods, has become an integral part of the overall elec-
tion process.
While possessing extensive power over primary and general elections in
determining voter qualifications and the manner of elections, the govern-
ment must not infringe upon constitutionally protected rights.1 7 Attacks
upon primary statutes typically come from individuals who assert they have
been denied proper access to the primary system. However, political parties
have also launched attacks, claiming infringement upon associational rights.
An explicit right to vote is not mentioned in the Constitution. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court has held that once primary or general elections
are established, there is a fundamental right to vote; substantial infringe-
ments upon this right are constitutionally suspect under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8 The Court has also invalidated cer-
consin delegates were seated at the Convention despite the stay and despite their selection in a
manner violative of Rule 2A, since, according to the National Party, there was no time at that
late date to provide an alternate selection procedure. 450 U.S. at 114-15.
14. Devlopments in the Law--Eletions, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1121 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Developments].
15. 93 Wis. 2d at 495, 287 N.W.2d at 528.
16. Id. at 491, 287 N.W.2d at 526; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 3, at
134.
17. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 141, 145 (1972). See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S.
724 (1974); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Administration of the electoral process is largely en-
trusted to the states. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 4; art. II, § 1. With respect to elections for
federal office, Congress can pre-empt state regulations. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112
(1970).
18. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residency requirement);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (requirement that residents
must own taxable real property or be parents of children enrolled in public schools in order to
vote in school district elections); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (state requirement that
200 voters from each of at least 50 counties sign petition nominating independent candidate for
President; the 49 most populous of the state's 102 counties contained 93.4% of state's voters);
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (payment of poll tax as precondition
for voting in state elections); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (state-mandated county-unit
1982]
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tain requirements for potential candidates wishing to obtain a place on the
primary or general ballot. Such requirements were viewed as limiting the
right to vote by restricting the voters' range of choice.' 9
A different but overlapping right which may be infringed by election
statutes is the first amendment right of association. 20 In this context, pri-
mary statutes that demand that a voter be affiliated with a party for a cer-
tain time before the primary election in order to vote for that party's
candidates have been attacked by voters as a denial of associational rights.
Thus, in Kusper v. Pontikes,2 ' an Illinois statute which prohibited a person
from voting in a party's primary election if he or she had voted in another
party's primary within the previous twenty-three months was struck down as
an unconstitutional abridgment of the right to associate with the political
party of one's choice. The effect of the statute was to preclude a voter who
had changed party affiliation from voting in any primary for almost two
years.
22
Just as individual voters have constitutionally protected associational
rights, political parties and their members are beneficiaries of Supreme
Court cases which have delineated associational freedom as an element of
first amendment rights. Beginning with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 23 the Supreme Court found in the first amendment, as applied to the
States through the fourteenth amendment, a right to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas.24 Associations themselves have
standing to assert violations of associational rights, 25 and interference with
the rights of the association is deemed to impinge on the members'
freedom.
26
Freedom of association is particularly valued where the association is
system of counting votes in statewide primary elections; system weighted rural votes more heav-
ily than urban votes).
19. Eg., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (candidate filing fees); Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134 (1972) (candidate filing fees); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (to obtain place
for presidential candidates on general election ballot, state required minor parties to submit
petitions signed by 15% of the number of voters in the last gubernatorial election; only new
voters could sign petitions; party had to conduct a primary, organize a state central committee,
and select delegates to a national convention).
20. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30.
21. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
22. Cf Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (upholding a New York primary statute
requiring party affiliation at least 30 days prior to the general election in order to vote in the
party's next primary election. The effect was to require affiliation up to 11 months prior to a
primary. The Court found the statute did not "lock" a voter into party affiliation from one
primary to the next).
23. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). There were hints of a constitutionally protected right of associa-
tion in earlier cases. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 247-48 (1957); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), but NAACP v. Alabama stands as the landmark case in explic-
itly recognizing freedom of association as a right deriving from first amendment protections of
speech, petition and assembly. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 12-
23 (1978).
24. E.g. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
25. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
26. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250.
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one with a political purpose, 27 and the right has been extended to political
parties.28 Even before freedom to associate was recognized as a discrete con-
stitutional right, the Alabama Democratic Party in 1952 successfully resisted
a challenge to a Party rule. Under this rule, primary candidates for positions
as presidential electors were required to support the National Convention
nominee.29 The right to associate requires states to provide "feasible" means
for parties, other than the Republican and Democratic Parties, to gain access
to the general election ballot.3 0 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has held that, in accordance with the first amendment
rights of association, the Republican Party can apportion National Conven-
tion delegates among the states without regard to the principle of "one per-
son, one vote".
3 1
Rights of association, like other first amendment rights and the right to
vote, are not absolutes. 32 This is particularly true in the election context,
where state regulation is a necessity.33 IriJenness v. Fortson,3 4 a Georgia ballot
access statute required minor party candidates to submit petitions contain-
ing signatures equal to at least five percent of the vote cast in the last general
election. This statute was sustained as protecting an important state interest
in avoiding voter confusion resulting from a ballot containing large numbers
of candidates with minimal public support. The Court found that the stat-
ute did not freeze the political status quo.35 Generally, preservation of the
integrity of the electoral process is seen as a valid state objective. 36 More-
over, states are not required to choose ineffectual means to that goal.
3 7
27. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968). See the discussion of Cousins in text accompanying notes 54 to 60 infa.
One article has suggested that the right to associate for political purposes should be recog-
nized as the central right at issue in the whole area of election cases. Ahrens & Hauserman,
Fundamental Election Rights.- Association, Voting and Candidacy, 14 VAL. U.L. REV. 465 (1980).
29. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
30. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (striking down an Ohio statute which made it
"virtually impossible" for third parties to gain a place on the general election ballot); see note 19
supra.
31. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976). Accord, Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th
Cir. 1968). Contra, Georgia v. National Democratic Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S 858 (1971); Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972). Rpon represents a reconsideration of Georgia and Bode in light of
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
32. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973).
33. In Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974), the Court said:
[T]he States have evolved comprehensive, and in many respects complex, election
codes regulating in most substantial ways, with respect to both federal and state elec-
tions, the time, place, and manner of holding primary and general elections, the regis-
tration and qualification of voters, and the selection and qualification of candidates.
It is very unlikely that all or even a large portion of the state election laws would fail to
pass muster under our cases ....
Md. at 730.
34. 403 U.S. 431 (1971). But set Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
35. 403 U.S. at 439.
36. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973). See, e.g., Marchioro v. Chaney, 442
U.S. 191, 196 (1979); American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783 n.14 (1974); Storer v. Brown,
415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972).
37. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 n.10 (1973).
19821
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A puzzling feature of the election cases is the standard of review which
the courts apply in balancing state interests against alleged burdens on con-
stitutionally protected rights. In non-election freedom of association cases
the Supreme Court has typically held that the subordinating state interest
must be "compelling" 38 and that the statute cannot survive when a more
narrowly drawn alternative would be effective. 39 This standard of strict
scrutiny has also been applied in right-to-vote cases where the franchise has
been totally denied. 40 But the Supreme Court has not been consistent in
applying the strict scrutiny standard to alleged violations of associational or
voting rights in election cases. Even when the compelling interest standard
is purportedly applied, the state election statute is not automatically struck
down. Thus state statutes which have restricted either the ability to vote or
the ability of candidates to obtain ballot positions have been upheld on the
basis of state interests characterized as "legitimate,"'4 1 "important," 42 and
"compelling. '43 As the Court pointed out in Storerv. Brown, given the practi-
cal necessity for regulation of elections, there is no rule which automatically
invalidates every substantial restriction of the right to vote or associate.
44
The decision in these cases is a matter of degree, and results are difficult to
predict with any great assurance.
45
A final complicating factor is that while political parties enjoy protec-
tion from undue state intrustions into their associational rights, the parties
themselves may be deemed to be engaging in state action, and thereby sub-
ject to constitutional restraints, when their rules or actions are an integral
part of the election process. 46 This is particularly true of the two major par-
ties. Political parties have a hybrid nature. They are voluntary associations,
but unlike other private associations, they have an ongoing, statutorily rec-
38. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
39. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
40. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
41. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973). Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51 (1973): "[A] significant encroachment upon associational freedom cannot be justified upon a
mere showing of a legitimate state interest." Id. at 58.
42. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. at 442.
43. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974). American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782
n.14 (1974). See generally Note, Prmaq, Elections: The Real Party in Interest, 27 RUTGERS L. REV.
298 (1974) [hereinafter cited as firAnas Elections ]; Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member
Voting in Political Party Avnagy Elections, 14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 259 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Non-Member Voting].
44. 415 U.S. 724, 729, 730.
45. Id. at 730.
The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be
made. Decision in this context, as in others, is very much a "matter of degree," very
much a matter of consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the inter-
ests which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disad-
vantaged by the classification.
Id. (citations omitted).
Tribe concludes that mild restrictions on parties need only rationally relate to legitimate
state interests, whereas substantial erosions of associational freedom must serve a compelling
state interest. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 13-22.
46. Detailed discussion of state action doctrines is beyond the scope of this paper. On state
action problems in the election law context, see generally Kester, Constitutional Restrictions on Polit-
ical Parties, 60 VA. L. REV. 735 (1974); L. TRIBE, supra note 23, at §§ 13-23 to 13-25; Develop-
ments, supra note 14, at 1155-1163.
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ognized role in the election of public officials. When political parties select
candidates, and particularly when those selections are incorporated by the
state (such as by preferred ballot access), it has been argued that the parties
themselves are acting as quasi-governmental entities.4 7 In the so-called
White Primary cases the Supreme Court struck down, as violative of the
fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, a series of attempts by the Texas
Democratic Party to exclude blacks from Democratic primary elections.
48
Lower courts have sustained state action challenges to party rules not
alleged to be racially discriminatory. 49 However, the Supreme Court has
not reached the merits in any case invalidating party actions for constitu-
tional violations not racially based. O'Brien v. Brown5° concerned a due pro-
cess challenge by delegates from California threatened with denial of seating
by the 1972 Democratic National Convention. In this case, the Court indi-
cated grave doubts about courts injecting themselves into party disputes,
specifically noting that no claims had been made of racial discrimination.
5'
Assuming party action in some contexts does amount to state action,52
there is a potential conflict between constitutional rights. To the extent
party actions are invalidated, the associational rights of the party and of the
members who support its actions have been infringed; to the extent the party
actions are upheld, the voting or associational rights of the plaintiffs may
have been infringed. At least two lower courts have suggested that a more
lenient standard of scrutiny is appropriate when reviewing a party's candi-
date selection processes alleged to violate constitutional rights. This lower
standard of scrutiny would arguably account for the constitutional rights of
the party and its supporting members.
53
An examination of one further case, Cousins v. Wigoda, 54 is necessary to
47. L. TRIBE, supra note 23, § 13-23; Developments, supra note 14, at 1161; Non-Member Vot-
ing, supra note 43, at 292-93; Pr'may Electrons, supra note 43, at 304.
48. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (fifteenth amendment); Smith v. Allright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (fifteenth amendment); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (fourteenth
amendment). Terry represents the farthest reach of the state action doctrine in the election
context, since the exclusion was from a "voluntary" club of Democrats, the Jaybird Association,
which conducted pre-primary elections. The Jaybird candidates invariably won the Demo-
cratic primaries and general elections. The Terry decision, in which there was no majority opin-
ion, has been explained only as a "response to the peculiar history of state attempts to foster and
shield racial discrimination." Developments, supra note 14, at 1163. See also Kester, supra note 46,
at 758, suggesting Terry went "too far."
49. See cases cited in note 31 supra, and cases cited in Comment, Cousins v. Wigoda: Frt-
mary Elections, Delegate Selection, and the National Political Convention, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 699, 717
n.83 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Delegate Selection].
50. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
51. Id. at 4-5.
52. The most conceptually perplexing question in state action theory is when, and why,
private entities should be held to constitutional standards originally adopted as restrictions on
governmental power. As previously indicated, this question is beyond the scope of this paper.
53. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 588 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. dented, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) (challenge to apportionment of delegates-among the states to the
Republican National Convention); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn. 1976)
(three-judge court), affdmem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976) (suit against a state and both major parties
asserting non-affiliated voters should be allowed to vote in party primaries; relief denied).
54. 419 U.S. 477 (1975). See generally Rotunda, Constitutional and Statutory Resr'cions on Poht-




an understanding of Democratic Party of the United States v. LaFollette. Like
O'Brien, Cousins arose over conflicts between rival groups of delegates to the
1972 Democratic National Convention. One group of delegates, Wigoda,
had been duly elected in a primary election conducted under Illinois election
statutes. The other group, Cousins, had been selected at private caucuses.
The Convention Credentials Committee, and ultimately the Convention it-
self, found that the composition of the Wigoda delegation violated Party
rules concerning slate-making and affirmative action, and decided to seat the
Cousins delegates. An Illinois appellate court affirmed an injunction prohib-
iting the Cousins group from serving as delegates. 55 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Illinois court was
correct in granting primacy of state law over DNP rules on delegate qualifi-
cations and eligibility.
In reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court placed pri-
mary importance upon the constitutionally protected right of political asso-
ciation enjoyed by the DNP and its adherents. 56 The Court applied the
strict scrutiny standard and found Illinois' interests in the integrity of its
electoral process and the right of its citizens to effective suffrage not compel-
ling in the context of selecting delegates to the National Party Convention.
The Court emphasized the national scope of the task--selection of presiden-
tial and vice-presidential nominees-performed by delegates to National
Conventions. The Court noted that if each state were allowed to establish
delegate qualifications without regard to Party policy, the result would be
intolerable. Therefore, the national interest served by the Convention was
greater than "any interest of an individual State."
'5 7
Two further points should be made about Cousinis. First, while some of
the Justices differed in their analyses of the case, they agreed unanimously
that Illinois could not force the National Convention to seat the Wigoda
delegates. 58  Second, the Court stated it was expressing no view as to
whether national party decisions on delegate selection constitute state ac-
tion. 59 In the last sentence of the opinion, however, the Court pointed out
no claim had been raised that the DNP was operating outside the confines of
the Constitution6°-thereby intimating the result might be different where
such claims are raised.
55. Wigoda v. Cousins, 14 Ill. App. 3d 460, 302 N.E.2d 614 (1973). The Cousins delegates
took their seats at the Convention despite the injunction. Criminal contempt charges in Illinois
were held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision. 419 U.S. at 481.
56. 419 U.S. at 487.
57. Id. at 490-91.
58. Id. at 488, 492 (Rehnquist, J., concurring), 496 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
59. 419 U.S. at 483 n.4.
60. The last sentence concluded with a quote from O'Brhn to the effect that the convention
was the proper forum for resolving the dispute. Justice Rehnquist stated that much of the
majority's language was too broad and argued that this last sentence virtually turned O'Brien on
its head since in O'Brien claims were made that Party delegate selection procedures violated the
Constitution. 419 U.S. at 492, 494 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Stewart, J., concur-
ring in the result). The Court may technically be correct that the Wigoda delegates filed no
claim in this action alleging the DNP was operating outside the Constitution. Much of the
lower court opinion, however, focused on the question of whether the constitutional rights of the
Wigoda delegates and Illinois voters were violated when the Wigoda group was rejected and the
[Vol. 59:3
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III. DEMOCRA TIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STA TES V. L4FOLLErTE
According to the Supreme Court, the issue in LaFollette was not whether
Wisconsin could conduct an open primary or whether the DNP could im-
pose its rules upon Wisconsin by requiring Wisconsin to limit voting in the
Democratic primary to publicly declared Democrats. 6' Instead, the issue
was whether Wisconsin could force the DNP to honor open primary results
that were reached in a process violative of DNP rules. 62 Despite strenuous
arguments to the contrary,6 3 the Court saw LaFollette as a delegate selection
case in its totality, since the delegates, who were admittedly selected in a
separate process that complied with DNP rules, were statutorily bound in
their convention votes by the results of the open primary.64 As such, the
Court found that Cousins controlled the outcome of the LaFolletle case.
65
The majority reiterated the principle that the DNP and its adherents
enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political association.6 6 In apply-
ing this principle to LaFollete, the Court held that freedom to associate for
political goals necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the members
of the association, to limit the membership to those persons,6 7 and to protect
the group from intrusions by those with adverse political interests. 68
While the state argued that the burden on associational freedoms was
minimal, the DNP claimed that such burdens were substantial. The major-
ity refused to decide this issue,69 stating that neither the courts nor the states
should substitute their judgments for the association's on the wisdom of
otherwise constitutional membership requirements. 70 Although refusing ex-
plicitly to address this question, later in the opinion the Court did refer to
the state's "substantial" intrusion into the Party's associational freedom.
7'
In evaluating the state's interests, the Court applied the "compelling
interests" test, again citing Cousins. The Court recognized the state's sub-
stantial interest in regulating primaries, 72 and that associational freedoms
are not absolute. 73 But, executing a fancy sidestep, the Court found the
Cousins group seated. The Illinois court answered in the affirmative. See Wigoda v. Cousins, 14
Ill. App. 3d at 471-80, 302 N.E.2d at 624-31.
61. 450 U.S. at 120.
62. Id.
63. Brief for Appellee, State of Wisconsin, at 7, 11-12. See text accompanying notes 85-87
ingfa.
64. 450 U.S. at 123 n.24, 125 n.30. As the National Party stated: "If the rules controlled
nothing more than the selection of delegates bound to cast votes predetermined by another
process, they would hardly be worth litigating." Brief for Appellant at 21.
65. 450 U.S. at 121.
66. Id. at 121-22 (citing Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama cx rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
67. 450 U.S. at 121-22.
68. Id. at 122 (citing Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952)).
69. Id. at 123-24.
70. Id. at 123 n.25.
71. Id. at 125-26.
72. Id. at 124 n.28 (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299 (1941)).




state's asserted interests-integrity of the electoral process, secrecy of the bal-
lot, increased voter participation, preventing harassment of voters-all irrel-
evant. The majority's rationale was that such interests went to the conduct
of the primary, not to the imposition of the primary results on delegates
selected in a separate process. 74 The state interests might be compelling as
related to the primary itself, but they did not justify intrusions into the asso-
ciational freedom of the National Party and its members.
75
In conclusion, the Court held that Wisconsin could conduct an open
primary. The state, however, could not bind Wisconsin delegates to the Na-
tional Convention to vote in accordance with the open primary results if
doing so would violate DNP rules.
76
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF LAFOLLETTE
The decision in LaFollette rests firmly on its own foundation and is fur-
ther buttressed by the precedent of Cousins. The broad holding in Cousins
apparently would find no compelling state interests in regulating Party pro-
cedures for National Convention delegate selection. The burden placed
upon the DNP in LaFolletle is substantially more severe than the burden
placed upon it in Cousins. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
sidered the burden minimal since declaration of party affiliation while vot-
ing, which would satisfy DNP rules, was not shown to be more effective than
the Wisconsin open primary statute in protecting the Party from adverse
influences. 77 Essentially the Wisconsin court found a "closed" primary con-
ducted under Party rules to be only slightly more closed than the "open"
primary. 78 Justice Powell, in his dissent, found the burden minimal because
the DNP is such an amorphous non-ideological creature that it has nothing
to fear from an open primary. 79 Both the Wisconsin court and Justice Pow-
ell missed the point. As an association, the DNP may wish to strengthen or
change itself. The Wisconsin law could prevent the DNP from implement-
ing any of its own judgments about who should participate in its most criti-
cal function-candidate selection. What meaning does freedom of
association have if the association has no control over who can participate in
its decision-making?
Further, while in Cousins the Illinois Court decision prevented certain
persons from taking part in the Convention, the Wisconsin court decision
would have compelled the Convention to accept delegates whose votes were
determined through a process that violated DNP rules. In Cousins the Court
unanimously agreed that a state could not force a Convention to accept dele-
74. 450 U.S. at 125.
75. Id. at 125-26.
76. Id. at 126. In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, Justice Powell
found no substantial burden on the Party, given its nonideological orientation, and found ar-
guably compelling state interests in support of the statute. Id. at 126-38 (Powell, J., dissenting),
77. 93 Wis. 2d at 499-510, 287 N.W.2d at 530-35.
78. Id. at 510, 287 N.W.2d at 535. The Court quoted from A. RANNEY, CURING THE
MISCHIEFS OF FACTION 166-67 (1975): "[Tlhe so-called 'closed' primaries are just a hair more
closed than the so-called 'open' primaries."
79. 450 U.S. at 131-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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gates, yet this is what the Wisconsin order would have done. There are sev-
eral factors which weigh against a finding that Wisconsin had any
compelling interests that would sustain its law. As previously noted, the
Wisconsin order did create a substantial burden. Also, the Cousins precedent
failed to recognize such compelling state interests. Furthermore, only Michi-
gan and Wisconsin mandate open, binding presidential preference
primaries.
80
Despite the correctness of the LaFolltte result, the opinion must have
seemed particularly hollow from Wisconsin's perspective. The Court essen-
tially said that the state and the Wisconsin Supreme Court had completely
misperceived the issues. The compelling interests the state asserted in sup-
port of its open primary were held to be irrelevant to the real issue-whether
the state could bind the DNP on delegate selection procedures. Thus, the
Court found that Wisconsin could conduct an open primary, but could not
bind the DNP with its results. To conduct a non-binding primary, however,
would seem an exercise in futility, a totally unsatisfactory option for a state
attempting to ensure a fair and orderly candidate selection process. 81 A
state is not required to utilize ineffectual means to achieve its aims.
8 2
States may attempt to circumvent the LaFollelle decision; however, the
results would be unchanged. Wisconsin could pass a statute requiring Na-
tional Convention delegates to be actually selected in an "open" primary,
based on the argument that LaFollette is not controlling; in the LaFollette
opinion, the state's interests in regulating the candidate selection process
were not weighed against the Party's associational rights. The real issue
presented in LaFollette was whether the asserted state interest in an open
selection process was compelling in the context of selecting delegates to a
National Party Convention. While the Supreme Court resolved the immedi-
ate controversy, it side-stepped this balancing issue, and supplied minimal
guidance for the future.
The "hard judgments," 83 which take place privately in chambers, are
not reflected in the LaFollette opinion. The Supreme Court has the admit-
tedly difficult challenge of articulating decisions that provide guidance in
the future beyond the immediate facts of the case84 and yet avoiding an
advisory opinion. Once one begins to look at the implications behind the
hard judgments required in balancing the various interests in this case it is
80. See note 101 in7fra.
81. Justice Powell, who saw the inadequacy of the Court's analysis of the state interest,
claimed the majority's argument on this point was "premised on the unstated assumption that a
nonbinding primary would be an adequate mechanism for pursuing the state interests involved.
This assumption is unsupportable because the very purpose of a presidential primary. . . was
to give control over the nomination process to individual voters." 450 U.S. at 134 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
82. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736; Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 n.10
(1973).
83. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 730 (1974). See note 45 supra.
84. Address by Chief Justice Vinson, American Bar Association Banquet (Sept. 7, 1949).
Chief Justice Vinson was candid on this point: "[T]he Supreme Court must continue to decide
only those cases which present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far
beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
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understandable, if not applaudable, that the Court preferred to save specific
pronouncements on them for another day.
Given that the defendant was the DNP, that it was involved in selecting
its candidate for president, that its selection would obtain an automatic bal-
lot position, and that its choice would become one of only two persons in the
country who had a chance to win, a strong argument can be made that
voting rights of Wisconsin citizens were at least implicated in this case. The
state claimed that this was a voting rights case;8 5 an amicus curiae brief was
submitted arguing the rights of independent voters;8 6 and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court expressly acknowledged that voting rights were involved.
8 7
Consideration of the possibility that the Party is violating voting rights
presupposes that the Party action amounts to state action. The Supreme
Court seemed to accept this presuppostion when it noted that Party mem-
bership requirements had to be consitutionally permissible. However, the
Court did not even discuss the voting rights of independents which the state
and amici curiae asserted.
One implication is that challenges by independent voters to Party or
state imposed requirements that non-affiliated voters not be allowed in
primaries are doomed to failure. Such challenges have been denied in lower
courts,8 8 and the result is undoubtedly correct. Independent voters have no
stake in the Party nor any desire to join. Therefore, the situation of in-
dependent voters is not analogous to the black voter in the White Primary
cases who deisred to join and met all of the qualifications except skin color.89
Nor can the independent be compared to the voter in Kusper v. Ponlikes,9°
who was prevented by the state from affiliating with the party of her choice
for twenty-three months. Whatever voting rights non-party adherents have
in party primaries are far outweighed by the associational rights of the party
and its members.9' This is true whether the primary is for National Conven-
tion delegates, federal offices, or state offices, since the relative weights of
these rights are not affected by the level of the office.
Another implication of the Court's refusal to discuss voting rights con-
cerns the future of the state action doctrine. In O'Brien, Cousins, and LaFol-
/ette, 92 questions were presented concerning the constitutionality of national
85. Brief for Appellee at 7, 17.
86. Ami us Curiae Brief (submitted by two independent voters from Wisconsin).
87. 93 Wis. 2d at 481, 287 N.W.2d at 522.
88. Young v. Gardner, 497 F. Supp. 396 (D.N.H. 1980); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp.
837 (D. Conn.), aJdmem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976); Smith v. Penta, 81 N.J. 65, 405 A.2d 350, appeal
dismised for want of substantial federal question, 444 U.S. 986 (1979). The Young Court said: in-
dependents "cannot expect they will have or are entitled to have the same rights of choosing the
candidate who is to run under a given party's banner as do the party faithful." 497 F. Supp. at
402.
89. See Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 842 n.4 (D. Conn.), afdmmr, 429 U.S. 989
(1976).
90. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
91. Accord, Prna y Elections, supra note 43. Contra, Note, The Party Afjhation Requirement." A
Constitutional Inquiy, 16 NEw ENG. L. REv. 71 (1980); Non-Member Potlng, supra note 43. The
author of Prznay Elections, supra note 43, at 308-11, points out that the voting rights of party
members are also impinged upon when the votes of outsiders with no collective stake in the
association are allowed to dilute the results of the party primary.
92. 450 U.S. at 124 n.26 (The Court favorably cited Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republi-
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party action. From these cases it is increasingly apparent that the Court will
not find a national party's actions unconstitutional unless there is gross
abuse. This is consistent with the general reluctance of the Burger Court to
find state action on the part of private entities. 93 The tenor of the above
mentioned opinions was to place emphasis on the associational rights of
political parties, and to deprecate or disregard both state regulatory interests
and asserted constitutional rights of party members or voters. This suggests
that the present Court views political parties more as private voluntary as-
sociations than as public quasi-governmental entities. It would appear that,
unless invidious race or sex 9 4 discrimination were found, the Court would be
unwilling to declare any party candidate selection procedures
unconstitutional.
Cousins was absolutist about the state's interest in fair and orderly elec-
tions, and held that no individual state interest could be compelling in the
national context of presidential candidate selection. LaFollete did not reiter-
ate this extremely broad finding. The Court admitted that states have "im-
portant" interests in regulating primary elections, and then refused to
consider Wisconsin's interests. This was unfortunate; since the Court refused
to weigh the state interests, it remains unclear to what extent, if any, the
LaFollette Court was retreating from the Cousins decision.
By refusing to draw lines through a process of balancing the various
state, voter, and Party interests present in LaPollette, the Court has created
the potential for some interesting situations. For example, in Rosario V. Rocke-
feller95 an affiliation statute was upheld against attack from individual vot-
ers. Conceivably this statute is now vulnerable to attack by the National
Party. The state statute struck down in Kusper, which prevented voting in a
party's primary for twenty-three months after voting in another party's pri-
mary, could presumably be adopted as a party rule and withstand attack
from the same voter. Such contradictory results would be intolerable. Hy-
pothetically, a national party could decide that the candidate selection pro-
cess will be restricted to precinct chairpersons, or state committee members,
or impose party dues of $5.00 or $1000.00 per year, 96 or impose not just
affiliation requirements, but loyalty oaths.9 7 These are unlikely possiblities.
One of the main goals of political parties is to attract voters in order to elect
party candidates. This goal should work as as self-correcting mechanism en-
couraging parties to be open and fair.
The point is that primary election cases involve overlapping, sometimes
can Party, 525 F.2d 588 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. dnied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976) to the effect that a
party's choice among the various ways of advancing its interests deserves the protection of the
Constitution).
93. See, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
94. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
95. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
96. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting denial of the vote in federal elections,
including presidential primaries, for failure to pay a poll tax).
97. Cf. Clark v. Meyland, 261 N.C. 140, 134 S.E.2d 168 (1964) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute requiring persons wishing to change party affiliation and vote in the new party's
primary to pledge in writing to vote for the new party's candidates in the general election).
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conflicting, sometimes complementary, interests of the state, the party, its
members, and non-members. These interests cannot always be reconciled,
but sensitive judicial pronouncements should take them into account with
an awareness that decisions in these cases are "very much a matter of de-
gree." 98 Opinions that sweep too broadly--Coustns---or side-step the hard
choices--LaFolleite-fail, not necessarily in their results, but in their rejection
of the opportunities presented by the facts for movement towards ultimately
workable resolutions of these bristly problems.
The immediate impact of LaFollelle outside Wisconsin will be negligi-
ble. No other state conducts an open presidential preference primary, bind-
ing on political parties.9 9 A number of states, however, conduct open
primaries for state and federal offices.l°0 Should state parties decide to chal-
lenge these statutes, LaFolletle will certainly provide strong arguments. 0 ' At
the least, LaFollette holds that a party's right to keep non-affiliated persons
out of a state party's candidate selection process is protected by the first
amendment. Only a compelling state interest will overcome that right. But
LaFollette is not dispositive. LaFollette arose in the context of presidential
candidate selection and is based on Cousins, which relied on the national
scope of the party's interest. At the state level the state's interest in the legiti-
macy of its own government and representatives amounts to a more power-
ful interest than that present in the National Convention context.' 0 2 The
result should depend on the balancing the court undertakes.
CONCLUSION
LaFollette marks another step in ensuring that national political parties
have sufficient freedom to make the changes they feel necessary to retain
98. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 730. See note 45 supra. Cf Primary Elections, supra note 43,
at 322 (suggesting that party interests in associational freedom should be considered when
courts review voter challenges to durational affiliation requirements contained in primary elec-
tion voter eligibility statutes).
99. Brief for Appellee, State of Wisconsin, at 37 n.41. See a/so CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, supra note 3, outlining 1980 delegate selection procedures for all the states.
Michigan also had an open, binding presidential primary. When the Michigan Demo-
cratic Party informed the Secretary of State that the state Party intended not to participate in
the primary, because it would violate National Party rules, a Michigan voter brought suit
against the Secretary of State, seeking to compel him to enforce the statute against the state
Party. The federal district court dismissed the suit, since it found the statute unconstitutional as
applied to the State Democratic Party, basing its decision on Cousins. Ferency v. Austin, 493 F.
Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
100. See Non-Member Voting, supra note 43, at 262.
101. Before the present case was decided, in 1980, the Washington State Democratic Party
challenged the Washingon "blanket" primary statute under which the names of all parties'
candidates are printed on a single ballot, and voters can vote for candidates of different parties
in the same primary, though not for the same office. Washington does not have a presidential
primary. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding no substantial bur-
den had been shown and finding compelling state interests in some of the same interests asserted
by Wisconsin in LaFolertte-secrecy of party identification and broad participation in primaries.
Heavey v. Chapman, 93 Wash. 2d 700, 611 P.2d 1256 (1980). Should this statute be challenged
again, the Washington Court would obviously have to consider LaFollette in analyzing both the
burden and the state interests, which were keyed essentially to voter rights. A concurring opin-
ion specifically indicated it was following the reasoning adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in LaFollette. 93 Wash. 2d at 706, 611 P.2d at 1259 (Horowitz, J., concurring).
102. See Developments, supra note 14, at 1210.
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their vitality. The message seems to be: leave the national parties alone, let
them make their own rules and resolve their own disputes. This, however,
will not make the disputes go away. By hinting at a retrenchment from the
broadest statements in Cousins, and by avoiding an explicit evaluation of the
proffered state interests, the Court has kept its options open for inevitable
future disputes. The cost of this approach is uncertainty. LaFollete can sup-
port virtually unlimited party leeway in determining its internal affairs, and
yet loopholes remain. The open binding presidential primary is now possi-
ble only with a national party's acquiescence, but at the state level, predic-
tions of the imminent demise of state imposed open primaries is premature.
As for the Democrats, it remains to be seen whether they have the wis-
dom to use their freedom to complete the reversal of 1980's setbacks.
Chrtstopher j Marzn

